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Abstract—Leveled Homomorphic Encryption (LHE) offers a
potential solution that could allow sectors with sensitive data to
utilize the cloud and securely deploy their models for remote
inference with Deep Neural Networks (DNN). However, this
application faces several obstacles due to the limitations of
LHE. One of the main problems is the incompatibility of
commonly used nonlinear functions in DNN with the operations
supported by LHE, i.e. addition and multiplication. As common
in LHE approaches, we train a model with a nonlinear function,
and replace it with a low-degree polynomial approximation at
inference time on private data. While this typically leads to
approximation errors and loss in prediction accuracy, we propose
a method that reduces this loss to small values or eliminates it
entirely, depending on simple hyper-parameters. This is achieved
by the introduction of a novel and elegantly simple Min-Max
normalization scheme, which scales inputs to nonlinear functions
into ranges with low approximation error. While being intuitive
in its concept and trivial to implement, we empirically show
that it offers a stable and effective approximation solution to
nonlinear functions in DNN. In return, this can enable deeper
networks with LHE, and facilitate the development of security-
and privacy-aware analytics applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have achieved remarkable
success across different domains. One of the factors that led to
the spread of these technologies in industry is the emergence of
cloud service providers. It lowered the entry cost to the usage
of DNN by offering different payment schemes. However,
some sectors like the medical, financial or governmental can
have constraints that prevent them from using these services
due to the sensitivity of their data. The risk of exposing a
patient’s data to a third party due to loss or theft has serious
ethical implications and could have serious legal or ethical
ramifications.
A potential solution that can allow these sectors to utilize
cloud services is offered by Leveled (Fully) Homomorphic
Encryption (LHE). LHE is a class of encryption schemes
that enables computations directly on the ciphertexts without
decrypting them first. It can be used to apply DNN models on
encrypted data. In this scenario the data owner, e.g. a clinic,
would deploy its trained model on the cloud and send the
encrypted patient’s data as input to the model. Then it will
receive the predictions back which are still encrypted. The
data owner can then minimize the risk of losing or exposing
the data to any other party including the service provider.
Unfortunately, LHE has several limitations that prevents direct
porting of DNN models used in the literature and the industry
to usage with private data. The two main obstacles are:
1) Mathematical operations are restricted to addition and
multiplication. Consequently, it is impossible to use the
nonlinear functions that are commonly used like ReLU
[1].
2) With each mathematical operation, the noise level in the
ciphertext grows and can silently corrupt the message
if it grows beyond a certain threshold. This limits the
possible depth of a neural network.
In literature (see section III), two general approaches have
been proposed to solve this limitation:
1) Train and infer with polynomial approximations of the
nonlinear functions.
2) Train with the original function then replace it with the
polynomial approximation at inference time.
The first approach is difficult to train due to problems like
exploding gradient. The second suffers from considerable loss
in predictions accuracy as the network gets deeper due to the
accumulation of approximations errors (see section III).
In the following, we propose an improvement to the second
approach. We identify the validity range of polynomial ap-
proximations as a major driver of inaccuracies, and introduce
a novel Min-Max normalization scheme that restricts function
inputs to ranges with low approximation error. Empirical re-
sults suggest that this scheme results in a significant reduction
of prediction accuracy loss, especially as the network gets
deeper, and even when low-degree polynomial approximations
are employed.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we revisit a few aspects of LHE that are
relevant to this work. We give an overview of the most
common components used in DNN, focusing on the contrast
between commonly employed DNN functions and approxima-
tions supported by LHE schemes.
A. Homomorphic Encryption
The first fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme was
devised by Gentry in his dissertation [2]. To allow the com-
putation of an arbitrary number of operations, he proposed a
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2procedure called bootstrapping that resets the noise to its ini-
tial level after each operation. However, it was computationally
too expensive for industrial use cases. Building on his work,
several other schemes were developed that skipped the usage
of bootstrapping and thus allowed faster computation, but only
up to a certain depth, after which the ciphertext gets corrupted.
This branch of schemes is usually called LHE. Among LHE
schemes, there have been different developments, each with
their own advantages and limitations, like BGV [3], BFV [4]
and HEAAN [5]. We briefly introduce those schemes with
focus on relevant properties to this work.
a) Supported operations: LHE schemes support only the
basic mathematical functions addition and multiplication. The
operands could be a combination of ciphertexts and plaintexts.
LHE implementations (e.g. SEAL [6]) offer optimizations
for operations based on those two functions, like exponen-
tiation by a non-private constant. From here on out, any
other function has to be replaced or approximated using the
two aforementioned functions. Additionally, BGV, BFV and
HEAAN support vectorization by offering the ability to pack
several messages into a single ciphertext and exploit the Single
Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) paradigm [7].
b) Noise growth and depth of mathematical circuits:
Noise is an inherent part of a ciphertext in LHE. Even a
newly encrypted ciphertext will have some noise, which is
responsible of the probabilistic property of LHE. With each
application of a mathematical function, the noise increases.
When the noise level exceeds a certain threshold, the ciphertext
is corrupted and the encrypted message becomes irretriev-
able. This noise threshold is controlled with different hyper-
parameters at the initialization time of the crypto-system.
However, attempts at increasing this threshold will result in
more expensive memory and computation costs, hence, it is
beneficial to keep the depth of the mathematical circuit as low
as possible. In particular, the noise generated by multiplication
of two ciphertexts is a lot greater than multiplication of a
ciphertext with a plaintext or additions with any combination,
hence, it is common in literature to associate the noise growth
directly with the private multiplicative depth of a circuit.
c) Integers and rational numbers: In most applications
and especially in DNN, the values of inputs are real numbers,
however, most LHE schemes including BGV and BFV do
not support floating point numbers. Most users resort to two
approaches of fixed-point representation of values in a given
message. The first approach is to scale the numbers by a
10k factor to take into account k digits after the decimal
point and neglect the remainder, then encode the outcome as
integers. The advantage of this approach is the simplicity of
implementation, however, it requires the user to keep track of
the factoring along the arithmetic circuit, which needs to be
undone after decryption to get the correct result. Additionally,
since division is not supported, the encrypted numbers will
keep growing, which requires an initialization of a crypto-
system with higher memory and computational costs. The
second approach is to preserve part of the ciphertext to the
integral part and another to the fractional part of the original
message. This approach has the advantage that division is
possible through the multiplication by a fraction. However,
vectorization is not possible anymore as it is only supported
with integers. We refer the user to section 3 in [8] for further
details.
B. Key Functions in Neural Networks
The focus on this work is on artificial feed-forward neu-
ral networks. They are built by cascading several layers of
operations in sequence, hence, they can be thought of as a
mathematical circuit, where each layer increases the depth.
Usually, these networks are visualized as a stack with the input
to the network as the bottom layer. Below, we list commonly
used neural network layers, with an emphasis on the operations
that they use. In terms of nomenclature, nonlinear layers are
sometimes called activation layers in literature. For clarity, in
the remainder of this paper, we will refer to the output of
a layer as the activations of that layer, and to the nonlinear
layers as such.
a) Fully connected and/or convolutional layers: The
function applied in these components is a weighted sum, i.e.
the input vector is multiplied by a weights vector, added to
a bias vector and then the results are summed. Since these
layers constitutes only addition and multiplication, they are
fully supported by LHE.
b) Nonlinear activation layers: These layers are usually
applied directly after fully connected or convolutional layers,
giving the network the needed nonlinear flexibility to model
complex functions. Some of the most common are the logistic
function, hyperbolic tangent and the ReLU. LHE cannot
support the first two due the existence of exponentiation (and
division when integer encoding is used), and it cannot support
ReLU due to the conditional branching. Hence, these functions
need to be approximated or replaced by others that only
employ addition and multiplication.
c) Pooling layers: In DNNs, pooling layers are periodi-
cally incorporated to increase the receptive field, to reduce the
spatial size of the data, to minimize the amount of parameters
and consequently limit the possibility of overfitting, as well
as to reduce the memory and computational cost. Two of the
most commonly used pooling layers are maximum pooling and
average pooling. LHE does not support the maximum function,
whereas averaging can be employed if fractional encoding is
used as explained in subsection II-A.
III. RELATED WORK
Neural Networks with Homomorphic Encryption
The problem of applying deep neural networks with LHE
is gaining momentum in the research community. Related
literature in this field covers multiple aspects, like prediction
accuracy or computational efficiency. To keep the paper con-
cise, we focus only on the work that directly relates to ours
i.e. the work on nonlinear functions.
CryptoNets [9] first demonstrated the application of neural
networks on homomorphically encrypted data. The network
was based on integers, prohibiting the usage of the division
operation. Instead, authors proposed to use sum pooling (called
scaled average pooling in the paper) instead of max or aver-
age pooling. The network had two nonlinear layers, which
3utilized the square function as the nonlinearity. It was applied
on MNIST dataset [10] and achieved an accuracy of 99%.
However, as the authors noted, the square function is not a
good nonlinear function because it causes an explosion of the
gradient as the network gets deeper.
Hesamifard et al. built on CryptoNets in [11] and [12] and
proposed an alternative to the square function. Their solution
was to generate approximations of the nonlinear functions.
To keep errors low, the authors optimized the approximation
function precisely within the range of expected inputs to the
nonlinearity, which required a sampling of the distribution of
input values. The authors focused on the sigmoid function.
Even though they reported good performance, their solution is
challenging to implement and train, as the network architect
has to progressively build the network to accommodate those
distributions, and generate new approximations for each new
layer and for each new dataset or architecture.
Chabanne et al. [13] propose adding batch normalization
[14] before each nonlinear layer, which removes the mean of
the distribution of activations. They then suggest to generate
approximation functions with low error around the origin.
They experimented with MNIST dataset on a network with 6
nonlinear ReLU functions. Similar to our approach, they train
with the original ReLU nonlinearity, and replace it with the
polynomial approximation at inference time. However, since
batch normalization does not constrain a distribution to lie
within a certain range, some inputs to the nonlinearity could
lie in areas with very high approximation error and deviate the
network from the correct prediction. To mitigate this problem,
the authors propose an extra training phase after replacing the
nonlinear functions with the approximations, treating the co-
efficients of the polynomial as learnable parameters. However,
reported performances still had deficiencies, especially when
the more desirable low-degree approximations were applied.
Robustness of Neural Networks
The topic of neural network robustness to perturbations or
lost precision in the activation values is an active field of
research. It has direct implications on topics like resiliency
against adversarial examples [15] or training and inference
with limited resources [16]. Even though those works do
not directly tackle the challenges faced when utilizing ho-
momorphic encryption, their findings are applicable to those
challenges.
Cheney et al. [17] developed three methods to evaluate the
robustness of a neural network. One of which is the addition
of random weight perturbations which has the same effect on
the signal in the network as the perturbations generated from
the nonlinear function approximations in our work. Empirical
results suggest that the last layers in the network are relatively
resilient to perturbations, whereas the early layers were much
more fragile.
Boura et al. [18] added some random error to the output of
each activation in each nonlinear layer. The authors report
that the experiments on all networks that were tested proved
resilient to at least 10% error, with little impact on the global
accuracy.
IV. METHODS
In this section, we present i) the methodology of generating
the polynomial approximations of the nonlinear functions and
ii) we describe our proposed method for constraining the range
of inputs to those approximations, with the aim of keeping
approximation errors as low as possible.
A. Approximation of nonlinear functions
Since LHE supports addition and multiplication, polynomial
functions are good candidates for approximation of the non-
linear functions. As stated by the Stone–Weierstrass theorem
[19] [20], given a sufficient polynomial degree, any continuous
function defined on a closed interval can be approximated as a
polynomial. However, when polynomials are used in the con-
text of DNN with LHE, the generation of the approximations
has to balance between:
1) Low approximation errors, to minimize the propagation
of errors and preserve the prediction accuracy.
2) Low polynomial degrees, to minimize the noise gener-
ation in the ciphertext.
In our experiments, we utilize Chebyshev polynomials as an
orthogonal basis for approximation, while keeping the degree
as low as possible between 2 and 6.
We experiment with ReLU due to its widespread usage in
modern DNN. However, low degree approximations of ReLU
suffer from relatively high approximation errors around the
discontinuity at the 0 origin. Consequently, we also experiment
with the Exponential Linear Unit (ELU) [21], which is smooth
and can be approximated with lower errors. A comparison
between the absolute error of the two functions is visualized in
Figure 1. To generate the approximation, we fit the Chebyshev
series of the desired degree in a least-squares manner to
points drawn from a uniform distribution centered at 0, in
order to preserve the nonlinearity of the original functions.
Notably, outside the approximation range, the polynomial
tends to deviate greatly from the ground truth nonlinearities.
See Figure 2.
B. Min-Max Normalization Layer
We propose a Min-Max normalization layer that aims at
strictly keeping the inputs to the polynomial functions within
the approximation range. It transforms the inputs to the target
scaling range, by normalizing the inputs into values within the
range [0, 1], and then scaling it to the approximation range.
More formally:
xnorm = (rmax − rmin)︸ ︷︷ ︸
scaling
∗ x− xmin
xmax − xmin︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0,1] norm
+ rmin︸︷︷︸
shifting
(1)
where x is the input, xmin and xmax are the minimum and
maximum values in the input respectively. rmin and rmax
are the target range boundaries, which are definable by the
network architect and can be intuitively set to the same range
used to approximate the original nonlinear functions.
Ideally, the minima and maxima would be computed on the
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Fig. 1. The absolute approximation error of the original nonlinear functions
with their corresponding polynomial approximation of degree 3 and approx-
imation range [−3, 3]. The high approximation error around the origin in
ReLU is noticeable.
whole input at each layer, however, this is not possible when
mini-batches are used in stochastic gradient training. Since pa-
rameter updates are applied after each training step, this would
turn the previous extrema irrelevant. Consequently, each mini-
batch is normalized using minima and maxima in the current
mini-batch as can be seen in algorithm 1. For convolutional
neural networks, the normalization is applied with respect to
feature maps, in order to preserve the convolutional property.
At inference, the moving mean of minima and maxima
computed during the training steps is used. This leads to a
deterministic model where the prediction of a single sample
depends only on its own features and is independent from
other unseen samples that are inferred at the same time. This
means that at inference time, this layer becomes simply a lin-
ear transformation with addition, multiplication and division,
which makes it compatible with the LHE implementation that
support division through fractional encoding (ex. SEAL[6]).
To make this layer compatible with other LHE implementa-
Algorithm 1: Min-Max normalization during training
Input: Mini-batch of size m: B = {x1...xm}; target
range: rmin and rmax
Output: Normalized and scaled B
xB,min ← min(B)
xB,max ← max(B)
Bnorm ← B−xB,minxB,max−xB,minBscaled ← (rmax − rmin) ∗ Bnorm+rmin
tions that do not support division, the linear transformation
can be easily absorbed into the weights of the preceding
convolutional/dense layer. For the convolutional layers, after
training the model, the weights are updated as follows:
w′ = (rmax − rmin)w
E(xmax)− E(xmin)
b′ = (rmax − rmin)(b− E(xmin))
E(xmax)− E(xmin)
where w and b are the original weights and bias. E(xmin),
E(xmax) are the moving mean of minima and maxima.
Similar to batch normalization [14], this layer has a regular-
ization effect since each training example’s features are seen
in conjunction and in relative values to the other examples
in the same mini-batch. Hence, the model does not produce
deterministic values for a single training example (only for
identical batches), which was found to improve generalization
by Ioffe and Szegedy [14].
V. EXPERIMENTS
The Min-Max normalization layer is tested with two differ-
ent baseline networks with different complexities:
a) LeNet-5-like and MNIST: A LeNet-like architecture
[22] is applied on the MNIST dataset [10]. To reduce the
number of parameters, and accordingly the number of the
computationally and memory expensive homomorphic evalu-
ations, we follow the Network in Network [23] approach and
replace the fully connected layers with convolutional layers.
The output layer has 10 feature maps, corresponding to 10
target classes, followed by a global average pooling layer or
global sum pooling layer to obtain a division free network.
Altogether, the network has five hidden convolutional layers.
b) SqueezeNet and CIFAR-10: To the best of our knowl-
edge, a scaled down version of SqueezeNet [24], [25] is the
deepest homomorphically evaluated network in the literature
as of the writing of this paper. That version was optimized
for the CIFAR-10 dataset [26] with a total of 10 nonlinear
functions. In this work, we use the original SqueezeNet with a
total of 18 nonlinear functions. Importantly, a homomorphical
evaluation of this configuration is so far not possible, since
other limitations like noise growth are still active fields of
research. Parallel research is tackling such limitations, e.g by
Chen et al. [27], who investigate a novel encryption scheme
that enables the usage of mathematical circuits up to depth
9, with the same initialization that would only allow a circuit
of depth 2 with BFV. In parallel, we consider our work as an
important effort to improve nonlinear function approximations
in very deep LHE networks, and demonstrate for the first time
the feasibility of using up to 18 nonlinear functions without a
significant loss in accuracy.
In both networks, LHE-incompatible max pooling was re-
placed with average pooling as the subsampling layer. We use
Keras [28] to train the model with a Tensorflow framework
[29] backend. For all experiments, Adadelta [30] is used as the
optimizer and categorical crossentropy as the loss function.
Each network has two baseline models:
Baseline 1: is the network with the original nonlinear
function, trained without the Min-Max layer, i.e. a configura-
tion that would be used if no LHE scheme was applied.
Baseline 2: is the network with the original nonlinear
function, trained with the Min-Max layer. This is the model
where the nonlinear approximations will be plugged in place
of the original nonlinear functions for LHE inference, and it
is used to measure the impact of adding Min-Max layers to
the model, compared to Baseline 1.
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Fig. 2. Ground truths of the nonlinear functions and their polynomial approximations of different degrees approximated in the range [−1, 1]. (a) ReLU and
(b) ELU.
It is important to note that our main concern during the
experiments was the robustness of the network to the pertur-
bations created by the approximated functions as the number
of those functions increase. Hence, our attention was directed
towards the loss in accuracy in comparison to the baseline
networks and not to the absolute accuracy.
After evaluating the baselines, each network was initialized
with different values of the hyperparameters of the proposed
method:
• the target scaling range in the Min-Max layer was set to
one of the ranges [−1, 1], [−2, 2] or [−3, 3].
• the approximation polynomial degree was varied from 2
to 6 for ELU, and to 2, 4 or 6 for ReLU.
• the approximation range was varied from [−1, 1] up to
the target scaling range.
Using the moving mean of extrema on the training batches
showed close accuracy in estimating the extrema of the whole
training set and results in normalization of the unseen ex-
amples within the desired range as can be seen in Figure 4.
The blue histogram visualizes the distribution of an unseen
example’s activation values of the same layer visualized in
Figure 3.
The behaviour of the hyperparameters was consistent across
the two architectures, independent of the network complexity.
The target scaling range did not have a significant impact
on the performance, as can be seen in the performance of
baseline 2 in contrast to the vanilla baseline 1 in Table I. An
exception is marked by ELU when the target scaling range
is between [−1, 1]. The LeNet-like architecture’s accuracy
decreased by 1.23 percentage points from baseline 1, and by
1.39 and 1.61 points using target scaling ranges of [−2, 2] and
[−3, 3] respectively. With SqueezeNet, the accuracy dropped
by 0.99 points compared to baseline 1, and by 8.02 and 5.59
from target scaling ranges of [−2, 2] and [−3, 3] respectively
(see rows 1-4 in Table I).
For low values of polynomial degrees, low values of approx-
imation range performed best. This behaviour was consistent
even when the employed approximation range did not match
and was smaller than the target scaling range. For example,
when a target scaling layer of range [−3, 3] was employed,
a polynomial approximation of 2nd degree and approximation
range of [−2, 2] performed better than a matching degree and
approximation range of [−3, 3]. However, as the polynomial
degree increased, the polynomial function with the approxi-
mation range that matched the target scaling range performed
best. Additionally, with the exception when the target scaling
range was [−1, 1], ELU’s approximations constantly achieved
or exceeded the performance of ReLU’s approximations with
a lower polynomial degree. For example, for SqueezeNet
with a target scaling range [−3, 3], ELU’s approximation
achieved a loss of 0.34 points with degree 3, whereas ReLU’s
approximation with degree 4 achieved a loss of 1.75 points
(see rows 5 and 6 in Table I).
VI. DISCUSSION
The results of the experiments show that the proposed
method can be used reliably for inference on homomorphically
encrypted data. Here, we provide further interpretation of these
results and give recommendations regarding the usage of our
proposed method.
A. Min-Max normalization
The Min-Max normalization layer offered an intuitive
method to control the range of activations in the network by
setting a single hyperparameter which explicitly defines the
desired range. Its performance was consistently high, with
different nonlinear functions and different approximations,
using different polynomial degrees and approximation ranges.
We attribute this to the Min-Max layer’s ability to utilize the
whole range of low polynomial approximation error, by scaling
activations with a high absolute value to the target range.
This is desirable, if we consider that the approximation error
6(a) (b)
Fig. 3. The output values of block 5 in SqueezeNet during training, (a) without deploying the Min-Max layer in the network and (b), with Min-Max
normalization layer in range [−3, 3]. Notice the stability of the activations which are passed to the nonlinear function within the desired range, when Min-Max
is used in contrast to the widening distribution of activations when it is not used. Plots were generated by TensorBoard[31].
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Fig. 4. Activations in block 5 in SqueezeNet during a forward pass on an
unseen example, right before applying the nonlinear function (in blue) and
the approximation error magnitude of approximations of ELU with different
approximation ranges (dashed lines in red, green and orange).
in different activations can have different signs (see absolute
errors in Fig. 1). Boura et al. [18] showed that using average
instead of sum pooling layers yields more stability to pertur-
bations in the network. Hence, average pooling in combination
with opposite-signed error values leads to a higher chance
of approximation errors to be canceled out. The shape of
the approximated nonlinearity and the parameterization of the
Min-Max layer plays an important role as well, as shown by
significant performance drops if ELU is scaled to the range of
[−1, 1]. In Figure 5, we show that constraining inputs to ELU
to the range [−1, 1] yields an almost linear function for most
of the target range (approximately [−0.25, 1]), with the actual
non-linearity lying only between [−1,−0.25]. This behavior
greatly hinders the capacity of the network by turning it into
a mostly linear function.
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Fig. 5. ELU and ReLU compared to the identity function in the range [−1, 1].
The vertical line at −0.25 marks the linear part of the ELU function. Notice
that within the range [−1, 1], most of the ELU function appears as linear.
B. Nonlinear approximations
As noted in section V, polynomial approximation functions
with a matching polynomial degree and approximation range
performed well in most cases, independent of the networks’
depths. However, our results also show that the best perfor-
mance is not necessarily achieved by approximation ranges
that exactly match the target scaling range.
We explain this by the fact that for a given polynomial
degree, the polynomial approximation of the nonlinearity gets
more accurate if a smaller approximation range is considered.
Since the activation values have a Gaussian-like distribution
roughly centered at 0 after the Min-Max layer (Figure 3),
most of the activations benefit from a very low approximation
error. However, as the polynomial degree increases, activations
that lie outside of the permitted range lead to a polynomially
high approximation error. The consequence is a noticeable
drop of network performance. This is visualized in Figure 4:
among the three approximation ranges shown, the approxi-
7TABLE I
THE ACCURACY OF EACH OF THE BASELINE ACTIVATION FUNCTIONS AND
THEIR CORRESPONDING APPROXIMATIONS IN THE NETWORKS WITH
MIN-MAX SCALING LAYER. n IS THE POLYNOMIAL DEGREE AND r IS THE
APPROXIMATION RANGE. THE MISSING VALUES INDICATE THAT THE BEST
APPROXIMATION OF THE GIVEN DEGREE IS THE SAME AS THE
APPROXIMATION OF THE LOWER DEGREE, E.G. THE BEST
APPROXIMATIONS FOR RELU WITH MAXIMUM 4TH DEGREE ARE STILL OF
3RD DEGREE. NUMBERS IN BOLD SIGNIFY THE BEST PERFORMING RANGE
FOR A GIVEN POLYNOMIAL DEGREE. THICK LINES SEPARATE BETWEEN
POLYNOMIAL DEGREES.
LeNet-5-like SqueezeNet
Nonlinearity ReLU ELU ReLU ELU
Vanilla Baseline 1 99.28% 99.01% 76.35% 73.50% 1
Min-Max
([-1, 1])
Baseline 2 99.55% 97.78% 81.87% 72.51% 2
n=2 r=[-1, 1] 96.65% 95.1% 72.65% 64.66%
n=3 r=[-1, 1] - 97.45% - 70.73%
n=4 r=[-1, 1] 99.33% 97.53% 80.35% 71.24%
n=5 r=[-1, 1] - 97.74% - 72.19%
n=6 r=[-1, 1] 99.47% 97.76 81.23% 72.23
M
in
-M
ax
(r
an
ge
=[
-2
,2
])
Baseline 2 98.75% 99.17% 80.79% 80.53% 3
n=2 r=[-1, 1] 96.69% 98.51% 58.68% 74.33%
n=2 r=[-2, 2] 91.03% 98.47% 68.27% 71.42%
n=3 r=[-1, 1] - 99.03% - 77.59%
n=3 r=[-2, 2] - 98.88% - 77.86%
n=4 r=[-1, 1] 7.96% 99.18% 11.17% 77.2%
n=4 r=[-2, 2] 98.41% 98.97% 78.66% 79.43%
n=5 r=[-1, 1] - 93.49% - 18.54%
n=5 r=[-2, 2] - 99.13% - 80.11%
n=6 r=[-1, 1] 19.4% 94.84% 9.87% 19.14%
n=6 r=[-2, 2] 98.71% 99.11% 79.97% 80.17%
M
in
-M
ax
(r
an
ge
=[
-3
,3
])
Baseline 2 99.49% 99.39% 82.04% 78.10% 4
n=2 r=[-1, 1] 96.12% 98.96% 33.12% 73.30%
n=2 r=[-2, 2] 99.18% 98.91% 75.75% 71.37%
n=2 r=[-3, 3] 97.11% 98.68% 71.36% 68.42%
n=3 r=[-1, 1] - 98.36% - 28.17%
n=3 r=[-2, 2] - 99.29% - 77.76% 5
n=3 r=[-3, 3] - 98.95% - 74.98%
n=4 r=[-1, 1] 6.10% 95.02% 10.08% 21.22%
n=4 r=[-2, 2] 99.18% 99.34% 64.65% 77.70%
n=4 r=[-3, 3] 99.33% 99.22% 80.29% 77.11% 6
n=5 r=[-1, 1] - 9.33% - 9.99%
n=5 r=[-2, 2] - 99.14% - 67.82%
n=5 r=[-3, 3] - 99.30% - 77.79%
n=6 r=[-1, 1] 16% 20.57% 10.09% 10.56%
n=6 r=[-2, 2] 93% 99.22% 18.94% 68.36%
n=6 r=[-3, 3] 99.44% 99.32% 81.46% 77.88%
mation function over the range [−1, 1] has the lowest error
in this interval, which covers approximately 63% of input
activation samples. In comparison, the approximation over the
range [−2, 2] has a slightly higher approximation error in the
interval [−1, 1]. However, up until the range [−2, 2], the errors
are smaller, yielding relatively low approximation errors for
approximately 97% of input activation samples.
Empirical results show that ELU can preserve the prediction
accuracies with a lower degree polynomial approximations.
We attribute this property to two factors:
1) The region with highest density of activations lies
around 0. It can be approximated in ELU with a
lower degree than in ReLU, because of the lack of a
discontinuity at the origin. Hence, less approximation
capacity is needed, and part of that capacity can be
used to approximate a bigger range (cf. Figure 1 for the
approximation errors of polynomial of the same degree).
2) The polynomial approximation of ELU does not deviate
too much away from the ground truth outside the approx-
imated range in contrast to ReLU. This is visualized in
Figure 2.
As expected, the performances of both ReLU and ELU ap-
proximations get closer to the baseline 2, as the approximation
degree increases. We stop at degree 6, as higher degrees will
not be practical in the context of LHE due to the magnitude
of the noise that will be generated because of the depth of the
multiplicative circuit.
C. Design recommendations for architects
To utilize the full potential of the Min-Max layer, we
highlight several factors that a network architect has to con-
sider at design time, and we offer several guidelines on how
to set hyperparameters of the Min-Max layers and of the
approximations of the nonlinear functions accordingly.
• The original nonlinear function: the function’s shape puts
a hard constraint on the target scaling range of the Min-
Max layer. The designer needs to take care that the range
is big enough to preserve the nonlinearity property of that
function. For example, as discussed, approximating ELU
with the target scaling range of [−1, 1] is suboptimal since
the resulting function is linear in a majority of the input
range (cf. subsection VI-A).
• Depth of the network: As the network gets deeper, the
architect has to choose a polynomial of lower degree to
minimize the noise generation in the LHE ciphertexts.
Additionally, to maintain the highest possible fidelity to
the baseline 2 performance, the approximation range has
to decrease, to match the approximation capacity of that
degree (cf. discussion in subsection VI-B).
• Hybrid polynomial degrees: Cheney et al. [17] showed
that the last layers of a network are relatively resilient
to approximation errors, compared to earlier layers. The
architect can employ a polynomial approximation of high
degree at the early layers, and a lower degree in the
subsequent layers in order to increase the performance
with minimal increase in noise generation in the cipher-
texts. We demonstrate this with SqueezeNet with a target
scaling range of [−2, 2] by employing a polynomial of
5th degree in the first three blocks then a polynomial of
2nd degree in the remaining six blocks, The prediction
accuracy increased 6.2 percentage points compared to a
network with only polynomials of degree 2.
VII. CONCLUSION
Min-Max normalization has been one of the preprocessing
methods used in the literature and the industry. In this work, a
novel use within the hidden layers was presented to facilitate
DNN inference on homomorphically encrypted data. The
proposed method is characterized by
1) Ease of initialization and trivial setting of hyperparam-
eters: the proposed method only has a single hyperpa-
rameter that explicitly defines the desired input range to
the nonlinear functions.
82) Simplicity of the training process: No additional training
steps are required other than the traditional training
process with plain data.
3) Compatibility: Min-max normalization requires little
change to current common architectures.
In the context of DNN with LHE, this work proposes a solution
to the nonlinearity problem by allowing the network architect
to use try-and-tested nonlinear functions during training, and
to use polynomial function approximations at inference time,
with minimum loss in performance.
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